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UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT 
____________ 
 
No. 18-1536 
____________ 
 
IN RE: ANDRE COOPER, 
     Petitioner 
 
 __________________________________  
On a Petition for Writ of Mandamus from  
the United States District Court 
for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania 
(Related to D.C. Crim. No. 2-01-cr-00512-005)  
__________________________________ 
 
Submitted Pursuant to Fed. R. App. Pro. 21 
July 12, 2018 
 
Before:   MCKEE, VANASKIE and SCIRICA, Circuit Judges 
 
(Opinion filed: October 18, 2018) 
___________ 
 
OPINION* 
___________ 
 
 
PER CURIAM 
 Petitioner Andre Cooper petitions for a writ of mandamus.  For the reasons that 
follow, we will deny the petition. 
 Cooper was convicted, following a jury trial in the United States District Court for 
the Eastern District of Pennsylvania, of participation in the affairs of an interstate 
                                              
* This disposition is not an opinion of the full Court and pursuant to I.O.P. 5.7 does not 
constitute binding precedent. 
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enterprise through a pattern of racketeering activity (Count 8); conspiracy to murder in 
aid of racketeering (Count 9); the murder of Tracey Saunders in aid of racketeering 
(Count 10); tampering with witness Tracey Saunders by murder (Count 11); conspiracy 
to murder Antonio Rykard in aid of racketeering (Count 14); the murder of Antonio 
Rykard in aid of racketeering (Count 15); conspiracy to murder Karriem Washington in 
aid of racketeering (Count 21); the murder of Karriem Washington in aid of racketeering 
(Count 22); using a firearm during and in relation to a crime of violence (Count 23); 
conspiracy to distribute more than five kilograms of cocaine (Count 25); conspiracy to 
distribute more than five kilograms of cocaine in a school zone (Count 26); possession of 
cocaine with the intent to distribute (Counts 29, 31); possessing a firearm in furtherance 
of a drug trafficking crime, and using and carrying a firearm during and in relation to a 
drug trafficking crime (Counts 30, 32); and distribution of cocaine (Counts 42 and 43).   
 On July 27, 2006, the District Court sentenced Cooper as follows: life 
imprisonment with no possibility for parole on Counts 10, 15, and 22 (the murder 
counts), the sentences to run consecutively to each other, N.T., 7/27/06, at 24-25; a term 
of imprisonment of 10 years on Count 23, the sentence to run consecutively “to each of 
the life imprisonment sentences” on Counts 10, 15 and 22, id. at 25; a term of 
imprisonment of 10 years on Count 30, the sentence to run consecutively “to each of” 
Counts 10, 15, 22 and 23, id. at 26; a term of imprisonment of 10 years on Count 32, the 
sentence to run consecutively “to each of” Counts 10, 15, 22, 23 and 30, id.; and, as to 
“the remaining counts,” a term of imprisonment of 10 years to “run concurrently with the 
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life imprisonment sentence,” id. at 25.  Those remaining counts would be 8, 9, 11, 14, 21, 
25, 26, 29, 31, 42, and 43.  
 Cooper appealed the criminal judgment and we affirmed, see United States v. 
Cooper, 343 F. App’x 830 (3d Cir. 2009).  In 2010, Cooper filed a motion to vacate 
sentence, 28 U.S.C. § 2255.  The District Court denied relief on the merits, and we denied 
Cooper’s request for a certificate of appealability.  We have also denied several 
applications by Cooper for leave to file second or successive § 2255 motions.    
 In 2016, Cooper filed a Rule 60(b)(6) motion, contending that the District Court 
failed to sentence him on Counts 8 and 11.  The District Court denied the Rule 60 motion 
and we denied Cooper’s request for a certificate of appealability. 
 Cooper now has filed a petition for writ of mandamus claiming, as he did in his 
Rule 60 motion, that the District Court failed to sentence him on Count 8, participation in 
the affairs of an interstate enterprise through a pattern of racketeering activity, in 
violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1962(c); and Count 11 (tampering with witness Tracey Saunders 
by murder, in violation of 18 U.S.C. §§ 2, 1111(a), 1512(a)(1)(A) and (C), and 
1512(a)(2)(A)).  He seeks to be sentenced by the District Court on these counts; 
otherwise, he argues, they should be dismissed.  Petition, at 1-2.  He further argues that 
the error is a fundamental one, and that, having unsuccessfully moved for relief under 
Rule 60, he now has no other adequate means for obtaining relief.  Cooper has attached a 
copy of the sentencing transcript to his mandamus petition, which he says supports his 
argument. 
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 We will deny the petition for writ of mandamus.  Our jurisdiction derives from 28 
U.S.C. § 1651, which grants us the power to “issue all writs necessary or appropriate in 
aid of (our) . . . jurisdiction and agreeable to the usages and principles of law.”  A writ of 
mandamus is an extreme remedy that we grant only in extraordinary situations.  See Kerr 
v. United States Dist. Court, 426 U.S. 394, 402 (1976).  To justify the use of this 
extraordinary remedy, a petitioner must show both a clear and indisputable right to the 
writ and that he has no other adequate means to obtain the relief desired.  See Haines v. 
Liggett Group Inc., 975 F.2d 81, 89 (3d Cir. 1992). 
 We have reviewed the sentencing transcript but do not agree that it supports 
Cooper’s argument that the District Court did not sentence him on Counts 8 and 11.  On 
the contrary, the transcript indicates that, after sentencing Cooper on certain specific 
counts to consecutive sentences of varying lengths, the District Court sentenced him on 
“the remaining counts” to concurrent terms of imprisonment of 10 years, id. at 25.  This 
reference to the remaining counts should include Counts 8 and 11, and Cooper does not 
argue otherwise.  Accordingly, insofar as the transcript does not provide clear factual 
support for his assertion that he was not sentenced on Counts 8 and 11, Cooper has not 
shown both a clear and indisputable right to the writ. 
We note that, although a written copy of the criminal Judgment has not been 
provided with Cooper’s petition, the purported contents of the Judgment were transcribed 
on the criminal docket by court staff, see Docket Entry No. 911.  The transcribed contents 
state that Cooper’s sentence on each of Counts 8 and 11 is a concurrent term of life 
imprisonment.  This difference in the sentences might suggest either that there was a 
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transcription error in recording the contents of the criminal Judgment, or that there is an 
actual conflict between the sentence imposed on the record in open court and the written 
Judgment, see generally United States v. Faulks, 201 F.3d 208, 211 (3d Cir. 2000) 
(“[W]hen the two sentences are in conflict, the oral pronouncement [in the defendant’s 
presence] prevails over the written judgment.”).  Either way, the record does not support 
an assertion that Cooper was not sentenced at all on Counts 8 and 11.  Moreover, we are 
satisfied that this issue could have been addressed on direct appeal and thus that there 
were other adequate means to obtain the relief desired.  Mandamus, with its “exceedingly 
narrow” scope of review, is not a substitute for an appeal.  In re: Chambers Development 
Co., Inc., 148 F.3d 214, 226 (3d Cir. 1998) (quoting In re: Ford Motor Co., 110 F.3d 954, 
964 (3d Cir. 1997)).  
 For the foregoing reasons, we will deny the petition for a writ of mandamus. 
 
 
 
